ttack on the
morrow. The detail that obtained in battle orders of later dates was
wanting, in view of the fact that greater responsibility was in the early
days placed upon Commanding Officers. The Battalion was to support the
attack as the third wave. The flanks were given and in the event of an
advance the Battalion was to keep Chocolat Menier Corner on its immediate
right. The fight commenced with an ordinary bombardment of forty minutes
chiefly by field pieces, which according to the text book are primarily
intended not for bombardment but for use against personnel. A battery of
heavy howitzers was also in action. The ordinary bombardment was followed
by an intense bombardment of ten minutes.

At 5-30 a.m. the Battalion advanced to the third line of trenches
immediately in rear of the Rue du Bois, and several losses attributable to
machine guns and shells were sustained. At 6-0 a.m. the Battalion was
continuing the advance to the support line when the 2nd King's Royal
Rifles asked for immediate support in the attack. The Battalion therefore
passed over the support line and quickly reached the front line. The
advent of a fresh unit made confusion the worse confounded. The trenches
which afforded little shelter were filled with men, and the enemy was
using his artillery freely. Machine guns in profusion were disgorging
their several streams of bullets. Communication trenches had been blotted
out. Despite the lessons of Neuve Chapelle there was no effective liaison
between artillery and infantry as the telephone wires were soon cut, and
as a consequence the inferno was intensified by the short firing of the
British artillery, a battery of 6-inch howitzers being the chief offender.

Numerous casualties had been suffered, and among them was the Commanding
Officer, who was killed. The command then passed to Major J.W.B. Hunt, who
decided that it was useless to attempt to assault the enemy position
without further artillery preparation, as the enemy's barbed wire was
practically intact, and the only two gaps that were available were covered
by enemy machine guns. A report on the situation was made to
Brigadier-General Thesiger, and instructions were received that on no
account was the Battalion to leave the front line, and it was to hold the
same against a possible and probable counter attack by the enemy.

At 10-0 a.m. the Battalion was ordered to prepare to take part in a second
attack to be launched at 11-15 a.m. Half