ess, through the syntheses it forms, as objective, although it
is not an object of sense but of thought; and, further, this very
objectivity subsists in the form of generalisations and meanings which
create standards for each individual in his relations with the physical
world. Eucken then concludes that there is a trans-subjective aspect
present in the conclusions of physical science itself.[19] And it is on
this fact that he bases the presence of a mental or spiritual life in
the very act of knowing at all. But it is evident that the whole of
man's potencies and relations are not confined to the knowing of Nature
and framing interpretations concerning it. There are other provinces to
which man is related--other objects besides physical ones to which his
attention is called to frame interpretations concerning them also.
History is one of these provinces. The subject-matter here is entirely
[p.72] different from the subject-matter of physical science. In the
latter the objects are physical; in the former the objects are not
things, but _will-relations._[20] We are in history dealing with the
effects of heredity and physical environment upon all organic life--man
included. But it has been already shown that man, though rooted in the
natural world and dependent upon it, is still the possessor of a world
which is above the physical. Man's roots in Nature have been unearthed
in a large measure; and his dependence on the world from which he has
emerged is greater than was suspected, and probably it will be
discovered in the future that he is still more dependent on what is
below him. But however deep his connection with Nature may prove itself
to be, he will still remain an unsolved problem if he is coolly stripped
of all the qualities he has gained since he emerged from the bosom of
Nature.

We are consequently led to the higher aspects of history where the
centre of gravity of the matter lies in the _relations of wills_.

By will-relations is meant the impact of individuals upon one another
from the side of _meaning_. It is through the expressions of the meaning
of our concepts that we are able to construct an intelligible world. The
individual's [p.73] deeper reality does not consist in the percept we
obtain of him, but in the mental attitude he has expressed towards a
mental attitude of ours. The _clothing_ of meaning is certainly
physical; there is our friend's physical body in front of us, and his
speech is audible in