undant harvest of captives. Hereford was
chased into Bothwell castle, which was still held for the English. But
next day the Scottish official who commanded there for Edward opened
the gates to Bruce, and the earl became a prisoner. Pembroke escaped
with difficulty on foot, along with a contingent of Welsh infantry. The
mighty English army had ceased to exist; and with the surrender of
Stirling, next day, Bruce's career attained its culminating point. His
long years of trial were at last over, and the clever adventurer could
henceforth enjoy in security the crown which he had so gallantly won.
The military results of Bannockburn were of extreme importance. The
ablest of contemporary annalists aptly compared Bruce's victory to the
battle of Courtrai. An even nearer analogy was the fight at Morgarten
where, within two years, the pikemen of the Forest Cantons were to
scatter the chivalry of the Hapsburgers as effectively as the Flemings
won the day at Courtrai or the Scots at Bannockburn. The English had
forgotten the military lessons of Edward I., as completely as they had
forgotten his political lessons, and their reliance on the obsolete and
unsupported cavalry charge was their undoing. Bruce, on the other hand,
had improved upon the teaching of Wallace and Edward I. His use of his
men-at-arms on foot anticipates the English tactics of the Hundred
Years' War. The presence of these heavily armed troopers in his ranks
gave him a strength in defence, and an impetuosity in attack, which
made it a simple matter to break up the undisciplined squadrons opposed
to him. Bannockburn rang the death-knell of the tactics which since
Hastings had been regarded as the perfection of military art. The
political lessons of the victory were of not less importance. It is
almost too much to say that Bannockburn won for Scotland its
independence, for Scottish independence had already been vindicated.
But the easy victory brought home to men's minds the full measure of
the Scottish triumph. It was already clear that so long as Edward
lived, England would never make the continued effort which, as Edward
I.'s wars both in Wales and Scotland had shown, could alone
systematically conquer a nation. Bruce's difficulties were not so much
with the English as with the Scots. It was no small task to unite the
English of the Lothians, the Welsh of the south-west, the Norsemen of
the extreme north, and the Celts of the hills into a single Scottish
natio
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