he did this, I
apprehended most serious results from the campaign in the North, and was
afraid we might even have to send troops from the East to head him off
if he got there, General Thomas's movements being always so deliberate
and so slow, though effective in defence.
I consequently urged Thomas in frequent dispatches sent from City
Point(*41) to make the attack at once. The country was alarmed, the
administration was alarmed, and I was alarmed lest the very thing would
take place which I have just described that is, Hood would get north.
It was all without avail further than to elicit dispatches from Thomas
saying that he was getting ready to move as soon as he could, that he
was making preparations, etc. At last I had to say to General Thomas
that I should be obliged to remove him unless he acted promptly. He
replied that he was very sorry, but he would move as soon as he could.
General Logan happening to visit City Point about that time, and knowing
him as a prompt, gallant and efficient officer, I gave him an order to
proceed to Nashville to relieve Thomas. I directed him, however, not to
deliver the order or publish it until he reached there, and if Thomas
had moved, then not to deliver it at all, but communicate with me by
telegraph. After Logan started, in thinking over the situation, I
became restless, and concluded to go myself. I went as far as
Washington City, when a dispatch was received from General Thomas
announcing his readiness at last to move, and designating the time of
his movement. I concluded to wait until that time. He did move, and was
successful from the start. This was on the 15th of December. General
Logan was at Louisville at the time this movement was made, and
telegraphed the fact to Washington, and proceeded no farther himself.
The battle during the 15th was severe, but favorable to the Union
troops, and continued until night closed in upon the combat. The next
day the battle was renewed. After a successful assault upon Hood's men
in their intrenchments the enemy fled in disorder, routed and broken,
leaving their dead, their artillery and small arms in great numbers on
the field, besides the wounded that were captured. Our cavalry had
fought on foot as infantry, and had not their horses with them; so that
they were not ready to join in the pursuit the moment the enemy
retreated. They sent back, however, for their horses, and endeavored to
get to Franklin ahead of Hood'
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