in great
force. Our loss in killed, wounded, and captured is estimated (in
Sunday's fight) at 1000; under the mark, perhaps.

I hear of no raid yet against the Danville Road; but the flour
speculators have put up the price again. Gen. Kemper told me this
morning that he had 3000 of the reserves defending the Danville Road,
the number Gen. Lee asked for.

Gen. Hood is so strong at Atlanta, that he has promised to send, in an
emergency, a brigade to Mobile.

Interesting events will crowd each other rapidly, now.

AUGUST 24TH.--Clear and pleasant.

Operations now must be initiated by the enemy. Gen. Lee writes that he
is too weak to attempt to dislodge the Yankees from the Weldon
Railroad. He cannot afford the loss of men necessary to accomplish it.
He says the enemy, however, was "worsted" in the two conflicts, that of
Friday and Sunday. And if he were to drive him away, the road would
still be subject to interruption. He thinks we can still get supplies,
by wagons, round the enemy's position, as well as by the Danville Road.
He also suggests that corn be imported at Wilmington, and that every
effort be made to accumulate supplies here; and he thinks we can hold
out until corn matures some six weeks hence, so that the moral effect
will be good, when it is apparent the efforts of the enemy to cut off
our supplies are thwarted. He thinks the enemy has relinquished the idea
of forcing our fortifications. But he says that Grant intended to force
his way into Richmond last week.

I wrote a letter to the President to-day, urging the necessity of
preventing the transportation of any supplies on the railroads except
for distribution at cost, and thus exterminating the speculators. The
poor must be fed and protected, if they be relied upon to defend the
country. The rich bribe the conscription officers, and keep out of the
ranks, invest their Confederate money and bonds in real estate, and
would be the first to submit to the United States Government; and the
poor, whom they oppress, are in danger of demoralization from suffering
and disgust, and might also embrace reunion rather than a prolongation
of such miseries as they have so long experienced. The patriotism of
1861 must be revived, or independence cannot be achieved. If a Peace
Democrat be elected, no doubt terms of peace will be tendered, on the
basis of _reunion_; and if they be rejected, perhaps the war may be
continued. Or Lincoln may modify his conditions of peac