runkenness against Gen.
E. merit no attention. The Secretary had indorsed on a paper (referred
by him to the President) that he shared the belief in the "want of
confidence," etc.--and no doubt would have him removed.
SUNDAY, OCTOBER 30TH.--Bright and beautiful.
Some firing was heard early this morning on the Darbytown road, or in
that direction; but it soon ceased, and no fighting of moment is
anticipated to-day, for Gen. Longstreet is in the city.
My son Thomas drew a month's rations yesterday, being detailed for
clerical service with Gen. Kemper. He got 35 pounds of flour (market
value $70), 31 pounds of beef ($100.75), 3 pounds of rice ($6), one
sixth of a cord of wood ($13.33), salt ($2), tobacco ($5), vinegar
($3)--making $200 per month; clothing furnished by government,$500 per
annum; cash, $18 per month; $4 per day extra, and $40 per month for
quarters; or $5000 per annum. Custis and I get $4000 each--making in all
$13,000! Yet we cannot subsist and clothe the family; for, alas, the
paper money is $30 for one in specie!
The steamers have brought into Wilmington immense amounts of
quartermaster stores, and perhaps our armies are the best clad in the
world. If the spirit of speculation be laid, and all the men and
resources of the country be devoted to defense (as seems now to be the
intention), the United States could never find men and material
sufficient for our subjugation. We could maintain the war for an
indefinite period, unless, indeed, fatal dissensions should spring up
among ourselves.
OCTOBER 31ST.--Bright. Tom's rations came in--worth $200--for a month.
Gen. Lee writes that it is necessary for the gun-boats to guard the
river as far below Chaffin's Bluffs as possible, to prevent the enemy
from throwing a force to the south bank in the rear of Gen. Pickett's
lines; for then Gen. P. must withdraw his forces, and the abandonment of
Petersburg will follow, "with its railroad connections, throwing the
whole army back to the defense of Richmond. I should regard this as a
great disaster, and as seriously endangering the safety of the city. We
should not only lose a large section of country from which our position
enables us to draw supplies, but the enemy would be brought nearer to
the only remaining railway communication between Richmond and the South.
It would make the tenure of the city depend upon our ability to hold
this long line of communication against the largely superior force of
the en
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