o the
idea of animal."[114]

"Relatively to the ideas of a nobleman and a citizen." What a long
explanation upon these words there must have been between the abbe and
the prince! The whole view of society must have been opened at once,
or the prince must have swallowed prejudices and metaphysics together.
To make these things familiar to a child, Condillac says, that we must
bring a few or many examples; but where shall we find examples? Where
shall we find proper words to express to a child ideas of political
relations mingled with metaphysical subtleties?

Through this whole chapter, on particular and general ideas, the abbe
is secretly intent upon a dispute began or revived in the thirteenth
century, and not yet finished, between the Nominalists and the
Realists; but a child knows nothing of this.

In the article "On the Power of Thinking," an article which he
acknowledges to be a little difficult, he observes, that the great
point is to make the child comprehend what is meant by attention; "for
as soon as he understands that, all the rest," he assures us, "will be
easy." Is it then of less consequence, that the child should learn the
habit of attention, than that he should learn the meaning of the word?
Granting, however, that the definition of this word is of consequence,
that definition should be made proportionably clear. The tutor, at
least, must understand it, before he can hope to explain it to his
pupil. Here it is:

"*** when amongst many sensations which you experience at the same
time, _the direction of the organs_ makes you take notice of one, so
that you do not observe the others any longer, this sensation becomes
what we call _attention_."[115]

This is not accurate; it is not clear whether the direction of the
organs be the cause, or the effect, of attention; or whether it be
only a concomitant of the sensation. Attention, we know, can be
exercised upon abstract ideas; for this objection M. Condillac has
afterwards a provisional clause, but the original definition remains
defective, because the direction of the organs is not, though it be
stated as such, essential: besides, we are told only, that the
sensation described becomes (devient) what we call attention. What
attention actually is, we are still left to discover. The matter is
made yet more difficult; for when we are just fixed in the belief,
that attention depends "upon our remarking one sensation, and not
remarking others which we may ha