"And considering the good progress in our cause in the colonies,
where our brothers oppose the cruel injustice done to the
Republics more and more in depriving them of their independence,
considering further the invaluable personal and material
sacrifices they [the Colonial Dutch] have made for our cause,
which would all be worthless and vain with a peace whereby the
independence of the Republics is given up ... [it is resolved]
that no peace will be made ... by which our independence and
national existence, or the interests of our colonial brothers,
shall be the price paid, and that the war will be vigorously
prosecuted."[254]
[Footnote 254: Cd. 663.]
[Sidenote: Afrikander statesmanship.]
It is impossible to withhold a tribute of admiration from the
Afrikander nationalist leaders. The qualities of statesmanship that
enabled a Cavour or a Bismarck to make a nation were theirs. From the
apparent hopelessness of the position created by Lord Roberts's swift
and overwhelming victories, they had brought round their affairs to
the point at which they now stood. The task which confronted the
Imperial troops was no longer to disarm the inhabitants of the
Republics, but to disarm and subdue practically the entire Dutch
population of South Africa. And to the military difficulties inherent
in the accomplishment of such a task in such a country, they had added
the opposition of political forces operating both in England and South
Africa with scarcely less embarrassing effects. Had it been merely an
affair of the island people and the island statesmen, the Bond might
still have won. The courage and endurance of the Imperial troops alone
would not have saved South Africa. The army was the instrument of the
people, and it was for the people to make use of this instrument, or
to withdraw it, as they chose. But the over-sea British claimed a
voice in the settlement; and the Bond had no friends among them. The
"younger nations" and the "man" at Capetown saved South Africa for the
Empire.
Before we proceed to consider the broad features of the military
operations by which the disarmament of the Dutch was at length
accomplished, a reference must be made to the account of the general
situation in South Africa addressed by Lord Milner to Mr. Chamberlain
from Capetown on February 6th, 1901. Among all the notable documents
which he furnished to his official chief, none a
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