of Russia had
been accepted to procure a separate peace with Holland; propositions
had been submitted both to France and Spain, tending to an
accommodation of differences with each of those powers singly; and
inquiries had been made of Mr. Adams, the American minister at the
Hague, which seemed to contemplate the same object with regard to the
United States. These political manoeuvres furnished additional motives
for doubting the sincerity of the English cabinet. Whatever views
might actuate the court of St. James on this subject, the resolution
of the American government to make no separate treaty was
unalterable.[11]

[Footnote 11: Secret Journals of Congress, v. 2, pp. 412,
418, 454.]

But the public votes which have been stated, and probably his private
instructions, restrained Sir Guy Carleton from offensive war; and the
state of the American army disabled General Washington from making any
attempt on the posts in possession of the British. The campaign of
1782 consequently passed away without furnishing any military
operations of moment between the armies under the immediate direction
of the respective commanders-in-chief.

{August.}

[Sidenote: Negotiations for peace.]

Early in August a letter was received by General Washington from Sir
Guy Carleton and Admiral Digby, which, among other communications
manifesting a pacific disposition on the part of England, contained
the information that Mr. Grenville was at Paris, invested with full
powers to treat with all the parties at war, that negotiations for a
general peace were already commenced, and that his Majesty had
commanded his minister to direct Mr. Grenville, that the independence
of the thirteen provinces should be proposed by him in the first
instance, instead of being made a condition of a general treaty. But
that this proposition would be made in the confidence that the
loyalists would be restored to their possessions, or a full
compensation made them for whatever confiscations might have taken
place.

This letter was, not long afterwards, followed by one from Sir Guy
Carleton, declaring that he could discern no further object of
contest, and that he disapproved of all farther hostilities by sea or
land, which could only multiply the miseries of individuals, without a
possible advantage to either nation. In pursuance of this opinion, he
had, soon after his arrival in New York, restrained the practice of
detaching parties of Indians agai