of which the house of
representatives might consist, than that there should not be more than
one member for every thirty thousand persons; but that each state
should be entitled to at least one. Independent of the general
considerations in favour of a more or less numerous representation in
the popular branch of the legislature, there was one of a local
nature, whose operation, though secret, was extensive, which gave to
this question a peculiar interest. To whatever number of persons a
representative might be allotted, there would still remain a fraction,
which would be greater or less in each state, according to the ratio
which congress should adopt between representation and population. The
relative power of states, in one branch of the legislature, would
consequently be affected by this ratio; and to questions of that
description, few members can permit themselves to be inattentive.
This bill, as originally introduced into the house of representatives,
gave to each state one member for every thirty thousand persons. On a
motion to strike out the number thirty thousand, the debate turned
chiefly on the policy and advantage of a more or less numerous house
of representatives; but with the general arguments suggested by the
subject, strong and pointed allusions to the measures of the preceding
congress were interspersed, which indicated much more serious
hostility to the administration than had hitherto been expressed.
Speaking of the corruption which he supposed to exist in the British
house of commons, Mr. Giles said that causes essentially different
from their numbers, had produced this effect. "Among these, were the
frequent mortgages of the funds, and the immense appropriations at the
disposal of the executive."
"An inequality of circumstances," he observed, "produces revolutions
in governments, from democracy, to aristocracy, and monarchy. Great
wealth produces a desire of distinctions, rank, and titles. The
revolutions of property, in this country, have created a prodigious
inequality of circumstances. Government has contributed to this
inequality. The bank of the United States is a most important machine
in promoting the objects of this monied interest. This bank will be
the most powerful engine to corrupt this house. Some of the members
are directors of this institution; and it will only be by increasing
the representation, that an adequate barrier can be opposed to this
monied interest." He next adverted
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