to creditor
states.

That the debt by being thus accumulated would be perpetuated was also
an evil of real magnitude. Many of the states had already made
considerable progress in extinguishing their debts, and the process
might certainly be carried on more rapidly by them than by the union.
A public debt seemed to be considered by some as a public blessing;
but to this doctrine they were not converts. If, as they believed, a
public debt was a public evil, it would be enormously increased by
adding those of the states to that of the union.

The measure was unwise too as it would affect public credit. Such an
augmentation of the debt must inevitably depreciate its value; since
it was the character of paper, whatever denomination it might assume,
to diminish in value in proportion to the quantity in circulation.

It would also increase an evil which was already sensibly felt. The
state debts when assumed by the continent, would, as that of the union
had already done, accumulate in large cities; and the dissatisfaction
excited by the payment of taxes, would be increased by perceiving that
the money raised from the people flowed into the hands of a few
individuals. Still greater mischief was to be apprehended. A great
part of this additional debt would go into the hands of foreigners;
and the United States would be heavily burdened to pay an interest
which could not be expected to remain in the country.

The measure was unjust, because it was burdening those states which
had taxed themselves highly to discharge the claims of their
creditors, with the debts of those which had not made the same
exertions. It would delay the settlement of accounts between the
individual states and the United States; and the supporters of the
measure were openly charged with intending to defeat that settlement.

It was also said that, in its execution, the scheme would be found
extremely embarrassing, perhaps impracticable. The case of a partial
accession to the measure by the creditors, a case which would probably
occur, presented a difficulty for which no provision was made, and of
which no solution had been given. Should the creditors in some states
come into the system, and those in others refuse to change their
security, the government would be involved in perplexities from which
no means of extricating itself had been shown. Nor would it be
practicable to discriminate between the debts contracted for general
and for local objects.