her invaded or menaced with invasion,
and in many parts with a strong imposing force both land and naval.
In those parts where the population was most dense the pressure was
comparatively light, but there was scarcely an harbor or city on any
of our great inlets which could be considered secure. New York and
Philadelphia were eminently exposed, the then existing works not being
sufficient for their protection. The same remark is applicable in a
certain extent to the cities eastward of the former, and as to the
condition of the whole country southward of the latter the events which
mark the war are too recent to require detail. Our armies and Navy
signalized themselves in every quarter where they had occasion to meet
their gallant foe, and the militia voluntarily flew to their aid with
a patriotism and fought with a bravery which exalted the reputation of
their Government and country and which did them the highest honor. In
whatever direction the enemy chose to move with their squadrons and to
land their troops our fortifications, where any existed, presented but
little obstacle to them. They passed those works without difficulty.
Their squadrons, in fact, annoyed our whole coast, not of the sea only,
but every bay and great river throughout its whole extent. In entering
those inlets and sailing up them with a small force the effect was
disastrous, since it never failed to draw out the whole population on
each side and to keep it in the field while the squadron remained there.
The expense attending this species of defense, with the exposure of
the inhabitants and the waste of property, may readily be conceived.

The occurrences which preceded the war and those which attended it were
alike replete with useful instruction as to our future policy. Those
which marked the first epoch demonstrate clearly that in the wars of
other powers we can rely only on force for the protection of our neutral
rights. Those of the second demonstrate with equal certainty that in any
war in which we may be engaged hereafter with a strong naval power the
expense, waste, and other calamities attending it, considering the vast
extent of our maritime frontier, can not fail, unless it be defended
by adequate fortifications and a suitable naval force, to correspond
with those which were experienced in the late war. Two great objects
are therefore to be regarded in the establishment of an adequate naval
force: The first, to prevent war so far as it ma