n
Washington, D.C., as Carranza's representative), with Obregon as the
head of their military forces, rapidly cleared that State of Federals,
with the exception of the port of Guaymas. These fights were no mere
bloodless affairs, but stubbornly contested, with heavy casualties, as
a decided principle was involved in the conflict. Villa, the old bandit
and personal enemy of Huerta, organized a force in Sonora, and Urbina
did likewise in northern Durango. Arms, and especially money to buy
them with, were hard to get. Funds were obtained from the tariff at
ports of entry, internal taxation, amounting at times to practical
confiscation, contributions, and gifts from various sources. It is said
that the Madero family put aside $1,000,000, gold, for this purpose.
Though a few individuals went over to the Constitutionalist cause, the
Mexican regular army remained true to the _ad interim_ Government. The
revolutionists either held or rapidly possessed themselves of the great
railroad lines in the majority of cases. Huerta, who is an excellent
organizer, soon appreciated the magnitude of the revolt and rushed
troops to the north as rapidly as possible, his strategy being to hold
all railroad lines and cities with strong columns which would force the
revolutionists to operate in the intervals between the railroads. Then
Huerta, with these columns as a supporting framework, pushed out mobile
columns for the destruction of the rebel bands.
The Carranzistas understood this plan and, to meet it, tore up all the
railroads that they could and adopted as their fixed plan never to risk
a general engagement of a large force. For the first few months, the
rebels, who had adopted the name of Constitutionalists, continued
recruiting their forces and destroying the railroads. The Federals
tried to repair the railroads and get enough troops into the north to
cope with this movement. They obtained new military equipment of all
descriptions, the army was increased, and old rebels, such as Orozco
and Salazar, sympathizers or tools of the old regime, were taken into
the Federal forces as irregulars and given commands.
To understand the apparent slowness of the Federals in moving from
place to place and their inability to pursue the rebels away from the
railroads, some idea must be given as to their system of operating. The
officers of the regular army are well instructed and quite competent.
The enlisted men, however, come from the lowest str
|