nd a three-mile zone around it, but was refused an increase
on the seaboard. The award was very unpopular in Roumania, but M.
Jonescu risked his official life by successfully urging the Roumanian
Government to accept it. But when it became perfectly evident, after
the signing of the Treaty of London on May 30th, that the former allies
were now to be enemies, the Roumanian government notified Bulgaria that
she could not rely upon its neutrality without compensation in the
interests of the equilibrium of the Balkans.

Such was the diplomatic situation when the Czar's telegram of June 11th
was received by King Ferdinand. Nothing could have been more
inopportune for the Bulgarian cause. Though the government had no
intention of changing its plan, sufficient deference had to be paid to
the Czar's request to suspend the forward movement of troops. The delay
was fatal. The Servians, who were already aware that the Bulgarians
were in motion, now learned their direction and their actual positions.
The Servian Government hastened to fortify the passes of the Balkans
between Bulgaria and the home territory, and the Servian army in
Macedonia effected a junction with the Greek army from Salonika. There
was nothing left for the Bulgarians but to direct their offensive
movements against the southern Servian divisions in Macedonia. The
great _coup_ had failed. Instead of attacking first the Servians and
then the Greeks and overwhelming them separately, it was necessary to
fight their combined forces.

Every element in the situation demanded the utmost caution on the part
of Bulgaria. Elementary prudence dictated that she yield to Roumanians
demand for a slice of the seaboard to Baltchik in order to prevent
Roumania from joining Servia and Greece. No doubt, had Daneff yielded
he would have been voted out of office by the opposition, for the
military party was in the ascendant at Sofia also. But a real statesman
would not have flinched. Seldom has the influence of home politics upon
the foreign affairs of a State operated so disastrously upon both. It
was determined to carry out that part of the original plan of campaign
which called for a surprise attack upon the Servians. It must be
remembered that all the engagements that had hitherto taken place
between the former allies had been unofficial, Daneff all the while
insisting that there existed no war, but "only military action to
enforce the Serbo-Bulgarian treaty." Nevertheless, on Ju