tocracy, and an
equitable distribution among moderate holders for active development of
the huge estates, held idle in great part or worked by peons, could the
progress and prosperity of the nation be put upon a solid basis. He
knew exactly what the remedy was and, though a landed aristocrat
himself by birth and inheritance, was not afraid of it.

As soon as he was elected to the presidency he set a committee of
competent, accredited engineers to work appraising property values in
the different states, and great tracts of hundreds of thousands and
millions of acres, previously assessed at half as many thousands as
they were worth millions, were revalued and reassessed at their true
inherent value. The _haciendados_ raised a frightful cry. They tried
threats, intrigue, and bribery. It was useless; the revaluation went
on. The new administration reclaimed as national property all that it
could of the _terrenos baldios_, or public lands, which under Diaz had
been rapidly merging into the great estates. It established a
government bank for the purpose of making loans on easy terms, and thus
assisting the poor to take up and work these public lands in small
parcels. Even before becoming President, Madero had advised the working
men to organize and demand a living wage, which they did. He attacked
the lotteries, the bull-fights, the terrible pulque trust, the
unbridled traffic of which, more than any other one factor, has
contributed to the degradation of the lower classes. He began to extend
the public-school system.

From the first the Cientificos hampered and impeded him. To foment a
counter-revolution they took advantage of the fact that in various
parts of the country there were disorderly bands of armed men
committing numerous depredations. These men had risen up in the shadow
of the Maderista revolution, and at its close, instead of laying down
their arms, they devoted themselves to the looting of ranches and
ungarrisoned isolated towns. Of these brigands--for they were neither
more nor less, whatever they may have called themselves then or may
call themselves now--the most formidable was Emiliano Zapata. His
alleged reason for continuing in arms after the surrender of the
dictatorship was that his men had not been paid for their services.
President De la Barra paid them, but their brigandage continued. And at
the most critical moment Pascual Orozco, Jr., Madero's trusted
lieutenant, in command of the military forces