e
repulsed the Carthaginians with considerable loss.

That evening the Roman army encamped about three miles from Cannae,
on the right bank of the Aufidus. The next morning Emilius, who was in
command, detached a third of his force across the river, and encamped
them there for the purpose of supporting the Roman foraging parties on
that side and of interrupting those of the Carthaginians.

The next day passed quietly, but on the following morning Hannibal
quitted his camp and formed his army in order of battle to tempt the
Romans to attack; but Emilius, sensible that the ground was against him,
would not move, but contented himself with further strengthening his
camps. Hannibal, seeing that the Romans would not fight, detached his
Numidian cavalry across the river to cut off the Roman foraging parties
and to surround and harass their smaller camp on that side of the
river. On the following morning Hannibal, knowing that Varro would be
in command, and feeling sure that, with his impetuous disposition, the
consul would be burning to avenge the insult offered by the surrounding
of his camp by the Numidians, moved his army across the river, and
formed it in order of battle, leaving eight thousand of his men to guard
his camp.

By thus doing he obtained a position which he could the better hold
with his inferior forces, while the Romans, deeming that he intended
to attack their camp on that side of the river, would be likely to move
their whole army across and to give battle. This in fact Varro proceeded
to do. Leaving ten thousand men in his own camp with orders to march out
and attack that of Hannibal during the engagement, he led the rest of
his troops over the river, and having united his force with that in
the camp on the right bank, marched down the river until he faced the
position which Hannibal had taken up.

This had been skillfully chosen. The river, whose general course was
east and west, made a loop, and across this Hannibal had drawn up his
army with both wings resting upon the river. Thus the Romans could
not outflank him, and the effect of their vastly superior numbers in
infantry would to some extent be neutralized. The following was the
disposition of his troops.

The Spaniards and Gauls occupied the centre of the line of infantry. The
Africans formed the two wings. On his left flank between the Africans
and the river he placed his heavy African and Gaulish horse, eight
thousand strong, while the two