blame, it is not for me to say. It is sufficient for my
purpose just now to know that, beyond two small cannon and one hundred
men, we were _without any military protection_. And could the few hundred
citizens of the place, most of them without firearms, be expected to make
a resistance against such a force, and with six cannon planted on the
hills overlooking the town? To ask the question is to answer it.

In reading over the two preceding paragraphs it occurred to me that the
impression might have been made on your mind, that I wished to find fault
with the General Government for removing from us all military protection
on our border. I have no wish to do so in this letter. I am no military
man, and hence am not so positive in my opinions as many other men, who
are doubtless far more capable of forming a judgment in such matters. I
merely mention the simple facts as they are patent to all who had the best
opportunities of knowing the true state of things. So, too, in regard to
both the Generals named. There is, since the burning of our town, a very
strong feeling of disapprobation in our community and elsewhere against
both, especially against General Couch. I cannot as yet share this
feeling. I know how apt we are, especially when smarting under severe
personal losses or grievances, to look around for some object upon which,
or some person on whom, to lay the blame. For my part, I would rather err
on the side of charity than on the side of unjust fault-finding and
denunciation. I prefer, until better advised, to endorse the views of my
friend Colonel A. K. McClure, himself one of the sufferers, and well
posted in such matters. He says:

"General Averill possibly might have saved Chambersburg, and I know that
General Couch exhausted himself to get Averill to fall back from
Greencastle to this point. I do not say that General Averill is to blame,
for he was under orders from General Hunter, and not subject to General
Couch. He had a large force of the enemy in his front, and until it is
clearly proved to the contrary, I must believe that he did his whole
duty."

These two sentences are guardedly worded. "General Averill _possibly_
might have saved Chambersburg." The enemy, under McCausland, Bradley
Johnson, and Gilmore, let it be recollected, had at least three thousand
cavalry, with artillery at command, eight hundred of the latter being in
town, the rest within supporting distance. Johnson's command occupied the
h