lf was later to
discover, had he even understood him properly, for More had looked at
him only to find his own reflection.
But there was nothing really new about the idea of infinite worlds which
More described in _Democritus Platonissans_; it surely was not a
conception unique to Descartes. The theory was a common one in Greek and
Renaissance thought. Democritus and the Epicureans, of course, advocated
the theme of infinite worlds in an infinite universe which More
accepted; but at the same time, he rejected their view of a mechanistic
and fortuitous creation. Although Plato specifically rejects the idea of
infinite worlds (in _Timaeus_), More imagines, as the title of his poem
implies, a Platonic universe, by which he really means neo-Platonic,
combined with a Democritean plurality of worlds. More filled space, not
with the infinite void of the Atomists, but with the Divine, ever active
immanence. More, in fact, in an early philosophic work, _An Antidote
against Atheisme_ (1652), and again in _Divine Dialogues_ (1668),
refutes Lucretius by asserting the usefulness of all created things in
God's Providence and the essential design in Nature. His reference in
_Democritus Platonissans_ (st. 20) is typical: "though I detest the
sect/ of Epicurus for their manners vile,/ Yet what is true I may not
well reject." In bringing together Democritus' theories and neo-Platonic
thought, More obviously has attempted reconciliation of two exclusive
world views, but with dubious success.
While More stands firmly before a familiar tradition, his belief in an
infinity of worlds evidently has little immediate connection with any
predecessors. Even Bruno's work, or Thomas Digges,' which could have
occupied an important place, seems to have had little, if any, direct
influence on More. It was Descartes who stimulated his thought at the
most receptive moment: in 1642 to have denied a theory which in 1646 he
proclaimed with such force evidently argues in favor of a most powerful
attachment. More responded enthusiastically to what he deemed a
congenial metaphysical system; as a champion of Descartes, he was first
to make him known in England and first in England to praise the infinity
of worlds, yet Descartes' system could give to him little real solace.
More embraces God's plenitude and infinity of worlds, he rejoices in the
variety and grandeur of the universe, and he worships it as he might God
Himself; but Descartes was fundamentally u
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