VI. _Concerning sacrifices and other worships, that we benefit man by
them, but not the gods._

I think it well to add some remarks about sacrifices. In the first
place, since we have received everything from the gods, and it is right
to pay the giver some tithe of his gifts, we pay such a tithe of
possessions in votive offerings, of bodies in gifts of <hair and>
adornment, and of life in sacrifices. Then secondly, prayers without
sacrifices are only words, with sacrifices they are live words; the word
gives meaning to the life, while the life animates the word. Thirdly,
the happiness of every object is its own perfection; and perfection for
each is communion with its own cause. For this reason we pray for
communion with the Gods. Since, therefore, the first life is the life of
the gods, but human life is also life of a kind, and human life wishes
for communion with divine life, a mean term is needed. For things very
far apart cannot have communion without a mean term, and the mean term
must be like the things joined; therefore the mean term between life
and life must be life. That is why men sacrifice animals; only the rich
do so now, but in old days everybody did, and that not indiscriminately,
but giving the suitable offerings to each god together with a great deal
of other worship. Enough of this subject.

XVII. _That the World is by nature Eternal._

We have shown above that the gods will not destroy the world. It remains
to show that its nature is indestructible.

Everything that is destroyed is either destroyed by itself or by
something else. If the world is destroyed by itself, fire must needs
burn itself and water dry itself. If by something else, it must be
either by a body or by something incorporeal. By something incorporeal
is impossible; for incorporeal things preserve bodies--nature, for
instance, and soul--and nothing is destroyed by a cause whose nature is
to preserve it. If it is destroyed by some body, it must be either by
those which exist or by others.

If by those which exist: then either those moving in a straight line
must be destroyed by those that revolve, or vice versa. But those that
revolve have no destructive nature; else, why do we never see anything
destroyed from that cause? Nor yet can those which are moving straight
touch the others; else, why have they never been able to do so yet?

But neither can those moving straight be destroyed by one another: for
the destruction of one i