of Napoleon's real plan.

"I have always had an idea that Ireland alone was the object they have
in view," he wrote in July, 1805, "and still believe that to be their
ultimate destination--that they [i. e., the Toulon fleet] will now
liberate the Ferrol squadron from Calder, make the round of the bay, and
taking the Rochefort people with them, appear off Ushant, perhaps
with 34 sail, there to be joined by 20 more. Cornwallis collecting his
out-squadrons may have 30 and upwards. This appears to be a probable
plan; for unless it is to bring their great fleets and armies to some
point of service--some rash attempt at conquest--they have been only
subjecting them to chance of loss; which I do not believe the Corsican
would do, without the hope of an adequate reward. This summer is big
with events."

This was written to Lord Nelson upon his return to Europe, after chasing
that Toulon fleet to the West Indies and back again. And a day or
two later, the same Vice-Admiral wrote to his friend very clearly, as
before:

"Truly glad will I be to see you, and to give you my best opinion on the
present state of affairs, which are in the highest degree intricate. But
reasoning on the policy of the present French government, who never aim
at little things while great objects are in view, I have considered the
invasion of Ireland as the real mark and butt of all their operations.
The flight to the West Indies was to take off the naval force, which
is the great impediment to their undertaking. The Rochefort squadron's
return confirmed me. I think they will now collect their force at
Ferrol--which Calder tells me are in motion--pick up those at Rochefort,
who, I am told, are equally ready, and will make them above thirty sail;
and then, without going near Ushant or the Channel fleet, proceed to
Ireland. Detachments must go from the Channel fleet to succour Ireland,
when the Brest fleet--21 I believe of them--will sail, either to another
part of Ireland, or up the Channel--a sort of force that has not been
seen in those seas, perhaps ever."

Lord Nelson just lately had suffered so much from the disadvantage of
not "following his own head, and so being much more correct in judgment
than following the opinion of others," that his head was not at all in
a receptive state; and like all who have doubted about being right,
and found the doubt wrong, he was hardened into the merits of his own
conclusion. "Why have I gone on a goose-chase?" he