as the "King of Arabia," and there is a sporadic crop
of ill-informed articles on this and other Arabian affairs in the
English Press. One of the features of the War as regards this part of
the world is the extraordinary and fungus-like growth of "Arabian
experts" it has produced, most of whom have never set foot in Arabia
itself, while the few now living who have acquired real first-hand
knowledge of any part of the Arabian peninsula before the War may be
counted on the fingers of one hand. Yet the number of people who rush
into print with their opinions on the most complex Arabian affairs would
astonish even the Arabs if they permitted themselves to show surprise at
anything. These opinions differ widely, but have one attribute in
common--their emphatic "cock-sureness." Each one presents the one and
only solution of the whole Arabian problem according to the facet which
the writer has seen, and there are many facets. They are amusing and
even instructive occasionally, but there is a serious side to
them--their crass empiricism. Each writer presents (quite honestly,
perhaps) his point of view of one or two facets in the rough-cut,
many-sided and clouded crystal of Arabian politics without considering
its possible bearing on other parts of the peninsula or even other
factors in the district he knows or has read about. The net result is an
appallingly crude patchwork, no one piece harmonising with another,
and, in view of the habit Government has formed in these cases of
accepting empirical opinions if they are shouted loud enough or at close
range, there is more than a possibility that our Arabian policy may
resemble such a crazy quilt. If it does, we shall have to harvest a
thistle-crop of tribal and intertribal trouble throughout the Arabian
peninsula, and the seed-down of unrest will blow all over Syria and
Mesopotamia just at the most awkward time when reconstruction and sound
administration are struggling to establish themselves. Weeds grow
quicker and stronger than useful plants in any garden.

Empirical statements sound well and look well in print, but they are no
use whatever as sailing directions in the uncharted waters of Arabian
politics. Putting them aside, the following facts are worth bearing in
mind when the future of Arabia is discussed.

The Hejazi troops were ably led by the Sharifian Emirs and Syrian
officers of note, and had the co-operation of the Red Sea flotilla on
the coast and British officers