nt or guilty. It may be well to
recall that outlawry did not date from the commission of the crime or
the flight of the criminal; and up to the time of conviction, judgment
going by default, the law gave no countenance to his assassination. The
rule affirmed by the statute of King Edgar, whereby sentence of outlawry
was pronounced only after opportunities had been granted for
repentance, continued to be in force all through the Middle Ages. This
appears from a note on the proceedings of the Salop Iter of 1293, which
states:

"Although one who is appealed of the death of a man, or for other
felony, make default at three County Courts, yet at the fourth County
Court he may appear, and give mainprize to appear at the fifth County
Court; and then, if he do not come, he will be outlawed. And if the
appellor abandon the prosecution, the exigend shall tarry until the
Eyre; and then he shall be tried (for he may return to the peace if he
will) at the suit of the King. And if he will not come, he shall be
called at the three County Courts; and if he do not come at the third,
he shall be outlawed at the fourth County Court, if he do not come and
give mainprize to come at the fifth County Court."

It may be taken for granted that, in the vast majority of instances,
this degree of consideration sufficed in the case of any person honestly
desiring to take his trial; but circumstances might exist which rendered
it impossible for a man to prevent his being outlawed, and then the
right of sanctuary might be of the utmost value in staying injustice.
That the supposition is not purely imaginary is proved by a remarkable
petition of the early part of the reign of Edward I., in which John
Brown, scholar of Oxford, states that during his absence at Rome he has
been falsely appealed by a Jewess for a Christian child, pursued from
county to county, and outlawed; wherefore on his return he was put in
prison and he now prays the King's mercy, without which he cannot
go to the common law. John Brown, it is clear, did not take
sanctuary--probably because he was not apprised of the facts in time;
otherwise it would have afforded him all needful security and allowed
him a period for reflection as to the wisdom of surrendering or quitting
the realm.

The right of sanctuary must have been founded on the principle that the
guilt of the fugitive had not been established. Even the ordinary law
was laudably sensitive on this point, and care was taken