give us the character of
accredited agents, which would necessarily tend to mix us up with
politics. Though this plan may have been very wise on the part of
Government, yet it by no means contributed to our comfort, as we found
ourselves frequently the objects of suspicion. Some of the chiefs
plainly said, "you are come to survey our country, and eventually to
take possession;" but most of them cared very little whether we came
as friends or foes: they had little to lose and everything to gain
by a _row_. With a few of the more influential chiefs the case was
different; if we had caused Dost Mahommed, the all powerful Ameer of
C[=a]bul, to become a fugitive, what chance had they if our views led
us across the Hindoo Khoosh? Such was their mode of reasoning; but it
must be confessed that they were ignorant of the immense advantage
the rugged nature of their barren land would give them over a regular
army, and thus they were unable to form an idea of the value of the
resistance which a few determined mountaineers might oppose. Amongst
other wild schemes, I fancy that the idea was once entertained, or
at all events the question was mooted, of sending a force to
Bokh[=a]r[=a] to procure the release of poor Stoddart. Without
dwelling upon the enormous sacrifice of life and treasure which such
an expedition of magnitude sufficient to ensure success would entail,
I may be permitted to point out what from personal observation I have
been led to consider as the "least impossible" route. The line I
should recommend would be the one we pursued as far as Koollum, when
the force should so shape its route as to avoid the great sandy
desert, which extends for three hundred and fifty miles from Koollum
to Bokh[=a]r[=a], by keeping to the north, and "striking" the Oxus,
which is navigable for boats of heavy burthen for many hundred miles
above the capital. But even on this plan we must suppose the force
to have already surmounted the thousand and one passes which occur
between Cabul and Koollum. Much has been printed and a great deal more
written and wisely left _un_printed concerning the practicability of
these routes for a modern army; it savours of a useless truism to
state, that if the government making the attempt has resources
sufficient in men, transport, and treasure, and dwells not upon the
sacrifice of these three necessaries for an army, the thing may be
done; but I can hardly conceive any crisis in political affairs which
c