well.
This uncompromising attitude made agreement impossible, and it was
aggravated by the aggressive action of the Bulgarian troops in the
occupied territory, who persistently endeavoured to steal ground from the
Greek forces facing them. In May there was serious fighting to the east of
the Struma, and peace was only restored with difficulty. Bulgarian
relations with Serbia were becoming strained at the same time, though in
this case Bulgaria had more justice on her side. Serbia maintained that
the veto imposed by Austria upon her expansion to the Adriatic, in
coincidence with Bulgaria's unexpected gains on the Maritsa to which
Serbian arms had contributed, invalidated the secret treaty of the
previous summer, and she announced her intention of retaining the Monastir
district and the line of the Salonika railway as far as the future
frontier of Greece. Bulgaria, on the other hand, shut her eyes to Serbia's
necessity for an untrammelled economic outlet to one sea-board or the
other, and took her stand on her strictly legal treaty-rights. However the
balance of justice inclined, a lasting settlement could only have been
reached by mutual forbearance and goodwill; but Bulgaria put herself
hopelessly in the wrong towards both her allies by a treacherous
night-attack upon them all along the line, at the end of June 1913. This
disastrous act was the work of a single political party, which has since
been condemned by most sections of Bulgarian public opinion; but the
punishment, if not the responsibility for the crime, fell upon the whole
nation. Greece and Serbia had already been drawn into an understanding by
their common danger. They now declared war against Bulgaria in concert.
The counter-strokes of their armies met with success, and the intervention
of Rumania made Bulgaria's discomfiture certain.

The results of the one month's war were registered in the Treaty of
Bucarest. Many of its provisions were unhappily, though naturally,
inspired by the spirit of revenge; but the Greek premier, at any rate,
showed a statesmanlike self-restraint in the negotiations. Venezelos
advocated the course of taking no more after the war than had been
demanded before it. He desired to leave Bulgaria a broad zone of Aegean
littoral between the Struma and Maritsa rivers, including ports capable of
satisfying Bulgaria's pressing need for an outlet towards the south. But,
in the exasperated state of public feeling, even Venezelos' prestige
f