very good man has to fear! If by chance this man should escape out
of our hands, he would have to sit there upon that bench and be a judge.
He would be called upon to pronounce on the lives of a Roman citizen. He
would be the right-hand officer in the army of this man here,[121] of
this man who is striving to be the lord and ruler of our judgment-seats.
The people of Rome at least refuse this! This at least cannot be
endured!"

The third of these narratives tells us how Verres managed in his
province that provision of corn for the use of Rome, the collection of
which made the possession of Sicily so important to the Romans. He
begins with telling his readers--as he does too frequently--how great
and peculiar is the task he has undertaken; and he uses an argument of
which we cannot but admit the truth, though we doubt whether any modern
advocate would dare to put it forward. We must remember, however, that
Romans were not accustomed to be shamefaced in praising themselves. What
Cicero says of himself all others said also of themselves; only Cicero
could say it better than others. He reminds us that he who accuses
another of any crime is bound to be especially free from that crime
himself. "Would you charge any one as a thief? you must be clear from
any suspicion of even desiring another man's property. Have you brought
a man up for malice or cruelty? take care that you be not found
hard-hearted. Have you called a man a seducer or an adulterer? be sure
that your own life shows no trace of such vices. Whatever you would
punish in another, that you must avoid yourself. A public accuser would
be intolerable, or even a caviller, who should inveigh against sins for
which he himself is called in question. But in this man I find all
wickednesses combined. There is no lust, no iniquity, no shamelessness
of which his life does not supply with ample evidence." The nature of
the difficulty to which Cicero is thus subjected is visible enough. As
Verres is all that is bad, so must he, as accuser, be all that is good;
which is more, we should say, than any man would choose to declare of
himself! But he is equal to the occasion. "In regard to this man, O
judges, I lay down for myself the law as I have stated it. I must so
live that I must clearly seem to be, and always have been, the very
opposite of this man, not only in my words and deeds, but as to that
arrogance and impudence which you see in him." Then he shows how
opposite he is t