any man could, yet as nearly all the
prisoners who had been captured by us during the campaign had been
sent, as fast as taken, to the usual depots North, they were then
beyond my control. There were still about two thousand, mostly
captured at Jonesboro, who had been sent back by cars, but had not
passed Chattanooga. These I ordered back, and offered General Hood
to exchange them for Stoneman, Buell, and such of my own army as
would make up the equivalent; but I would not exchange for his
prisoners generally, because I knew these would have to be sent to
their own regiments, away from my army, whereas all we could give
him could at once be put to duty in his immediate army. Quite an
angry correspondence grew up between us, which was published at the
time in the newspapers, but it is not to be found in any book of
which I have present knowledge, and therefore is given here, as
illustrative of the events referred to, and of the feelings of the
actors in the game of war at that particular crisis, together with
certain other original letters of Generals Grant and Halleck, never
hitherto published.
HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES
CITY POINT, VIRGINIA, September 12, 1864
Major-General W. T. SHERMAN, commanding Military Division of the
Mississippi
GENERAL: I send Lieutenant-Colonel Horace Porter, of my staff, with
this. Colonel Porter will explain to you the exact condition of
affairs here, better than I can do in the limits of a letter.
Although I feel myself strong enough now for offensive operations,
I am holding on quietly, to get advantage of recruits and
convalescents, who are coming forward very rapidly. My lines are
necessarily very long, extending from Deep Bottom, north of the
James, across the peninsula formed by the Appomattox and the James,
and south of the Appomattox to the Weldon road. This line is very
strongly fortified, and can be held with comparatively few men;
but, from its great length, necessarily takes many in the
aggregate. I propose, when I do move, to extend my left so as to
control what is known as the Southside, or Lynchburg & Petersburg
road; then, if possible, to keep the Danville road out. At the
same time this move is made, I want to send a force of from six to
ten thousand men against Wilmington. The way I propose to do this
is to land the men north of Fort Fisher, and hold that point. At
the same time a large naval fleet will be assembled there, and the
iron-cla
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