tates of
Kansas and Nevada, which States did not vote in 1860, thus swelling the
aggregate to 4,015,773 and the net increase during the three years and a
half of war to 145,551. A table is appended showing particulars. To
this again should be added the number of all soldiers in the field from
Massachusetts, Rhode Island, New Jersey, Delaware, Indiana, Illinois, and
California, who by the laws of those States could not vote away from their
homes, and which number can not be less than 90,000. Nor yet is this all.
The number in organized Territories is triple now what it was four years
ago--while thousands, white and black, join us as the national arms press
back the insurgent lines. So much is shown, affirmatively and negatively,
by the election. It is not material to inquire how the increase has been
produced or to show that it would have been greater but for the war, which
is probably true. The important fact remains demonstrated that we have
more men now than we had when the war began; that we are not exhausted nor
in process of exhaustion; that we are gaining strength and may if need be
maintain the contest indefinitely. [This sentence recognizes the concern
of a guerilla war after the main war finished.]This as to men. Material
resources are now more complete and abundant than ever.

The national resources, then, are unexhausted, and, as we believe,
inexhaustible. The public purpose to re-establish and maintain the
national authority is unchanged, and, as we believe, unchangeable.
The manner of continuing the effort remains to choose. On careful
consideration of all the evidence accessible it seems to me that no
attempt at negotiation with the insurgent leader could result in any good.
He would accept nothing short of severance of the Union, precisely what
we will not and can not give. His declarations to this effect are explicit
and oft repeated. He does not attempt to deceive us. He affords us no
excuse to deceive ourselves. He can not voluntarily reaccept the Union;
we can not voluntarily yield it. Between him and us the issue is distinct,
simple, and inflexible. It is an issue which can only be tried by war and
decided by victory. If we yield, we are beaten; if the Southern people
fail him, he is beaten. Either way it would be the victory and defeat
following war. What is true, however, of him who heads the insurgent cause
is not necessarily true of those who follow. Although he can not reaccept
the Union, they ca