. We may be sure, however, that Seward failed to
observe that Lincoln's tactlessness in social matters did not extend to
his management of men in politics; we may feel sure that what remained
in his mind was Lincoln's unwillingness to enter office without William
Henry Seward as Secretary of State.
The promptness with which Seward assumed the role of prime minister
bears out this inference. The same fact also reveals a puzzling detail
of Seward's character which amounted to obtuseness--his forgetfulness
that appointment to cabinet offices had not transformed his old
political rivals Chase and Cameron, nor softened the feelings of an
inveterate political enemy, Welles, the Secretary of the Navy. The
impression which Seward made on his colleagues in the first days of the
new Government has been thus sharply recorded by Welles: "The Secretary
of State was, of course, apprised of every meeting [of ministers] and
never failed in his attendance, whatever was the subject-matter,
and though entirely out of his official province. He was vigilantly
attentive to every measure and movement in other Departments, however
trivial--as much so as to his own--watched and scrutinized every
appointment that was made, or proposed to be made, but was not
communicative in regard to the transaction of the State Department."
So eager was Seward to keep all the threads of affairs in his own hands
that he tried to persuade Lincoln not to hold cabinet meetings but
merely to consult with particular ministers, and with the Secretary
of State, as occasion might demand. A combined protest from the other
Secretaries, however, caused the regular holding of Cabinet meetings.
With regard to the Confederacy, Seward's policy was one of
non-resistance. For this he had two reasons. The first of these was
his rooted delusion that the bulk of the Southerners were opposed to
secession and, if let alone, would force their leaders to reconsider
their action. He might have quoted the nursery rhyme, "Let them alone
and they'll come home"; it would have been like him and in tune with
a frivolous side of his nature. He was quite as irresponsible when he
complacently assured the North that the trouble would all blow over
within ninety days. He also believed that any display of force would
convert these hypothetical Unionists of the South from friends to
enemies and would consolidate opinion in the Confederacy to produce
war. In justice to Seward it must be remembere
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