thing to do, and it was
done abominably. It should have given us Constantinople and brought
Bulgaria to our side; it gave us a tragic history of administrative
indolence and negligence, and wasted bravery and devotion. I was very
hopeful of the western offensive in 1915; and in 1916 I counted still on
our continuing push. I believe we were very near something like decision
this last September, but some archaic dream of doing it with cavalry
dashed these hopes. The "Tanks" arrived to late to do their proper work,
and their method of use is being worked out very slowly.... I still
believe in the western push, if only we push it for all we are worth.
If only we push it with our brains, with our available and still
unorganised brains; if only we realise that the art of modern war is to
invent and invent and invent. Hitherto I have always hoped and looked
for decision, a complete victory that would enable the Allies to dictate
peace. But such an expectation is largely conditioned by these delicate
questions of adaptability that my tour of the front has made very urgent
in my mind. A spiteful German American writer has said that the British
would rather kill twenty thousand of their men than break one general.
Even a grain of truth in such a remark is a very valid reasoning for
lengthening one's estimate of the duration of the war.
There can be no doubt that the Western allies are playing a winning game
upon the western front, and that this is the front of decision now. It
is not in doubt that they are beating the Germans and shoving them back.
The uncertain factor is the rate at which they are shoving them back.
If they can presently get to so rapid an advance as to bring the average
rate since July 1st up to two or three miles a day, then we shall still
see the Allies dictating terms. But if the shove drags on at its present
pace of less than a mile and four thousand prisoners a week over the
limited Somme front only, if nothing is attempted elsewhere to increase
the area of pressure, [*This was written originally before the French
offensive at Verdun.] then the intolerable stress and boredom of the war
will bring about a peace long before the Germans are decisively crushed.
But the war, universally detested, may go on into 1918 or 1919. Food
riots, famine, and general disorganisation will come before 1920, if it
does. The Allies have a winning game before them, but they seem unable
to discover and promote the military geni
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