re some persons who, being (28) born of the
People, are yet by natural instinct not commoners. For my part I pardon
the People its own democracy, as, indeed, it is pardonable in any one to
do good to himself. (29) But the man who, not being himself one of the
People, prefers to live in a state democratically governed rather than
in an oligarchical state may be said to smooth his own path towards
iniquity. He knows that a bad man has a better chance of slipping
through the fingers of justice in a democratic than in an oligarchical
state.
(26) Or, "and which are good for nothing."
(27) Or,"its own friends and supporters."
(28) Reading {ontes} or (if {gnontes}), "who, recognising the nature
of the People, have no popular leaning." Gutschmidt conj. {enioi
egguoi ontes}, i.e. Pericles.
(29) On the principle that "the knee is nearer than the shin-bone,"
{gonu knemes}, or, as we say, "charity begins at home."
III
I repeat that my position concerning the polity of the Athenians is
this: the type (1) of polity is not to my taste, but given that a
democratic form of government has been agreed upon, they do seem to me
to go the right way to preserve the democracy by the adoption of the
particular type (2) which I have set forth.
(1) Or, "manner."
(2) Or, "manner."
But there are other objections brought, as I am aware, against the
Athenians, by certain people, and to this effect. It not seldom happens,
they tell us, that a man is unable to transact a piece of business with
the senate or the People, even if he sit waiting a whole year. Now this
does happen at Athens, and for no other reason save that, owing to the
immense mass of affairs they are unable to work off all the business on
hand, and dismiss the applicants. And how in the world should they be
able, considering in the first place, that they, the Athenians, have
more festivals (3) to celebrate than any other state throughout the
length and breadth of Hellas? (During these festivals, of course, the
transaction of any sort of affairs of state is still more out of the
question.) (4) In the next place, only consider the number of cases they
have to decide--what with private suits and public causes and scrutinies
of accounts, etc., more than the whole of the rest of mankind put
together; while the senate has multifarious points to advise upon
concerning peace and war, (5) concerning ways and means, concerning the
framing and passing of
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