cross upon. This more than
doubled the distance from Grand Gulf to the high land back of
Bruinsburg. No time was to be lost in securing this foothold. Our
transportation was not sufficient to move all the army across the river
at one trip, or even two; but the landing of the 13th corps and one
division of the 17th was effected during the day, April 30th, and early
evening. McClernand was advanced as soon as ammunition and two days'
rations (to last five) could be issued to his men. The bluffs were
reached an hour before sunset and McClernand was pushed on, hoping to
reach Port Gibson and save the bridge spanning the Bayou Pierre before
the enemy could get there; for crossing a stream in the presence of an
enemy is always difficult. Port Gibson, too, is the starting point of
roads to Grand Gulf, Vicksburg and Jackson.

McClernand's advance met the enemy about five miles west of Port Gibson
at Thompson's plantation. There was some firing during the night, but
nothing rising to the dignity of a battle until daylight. The enemy had
taken a strong natural position with most of the Grand Gulf garrison,
numbering about seven or eight thousand men, under General Bowen. His
hope was to hold me in check until reinforcements under Loring could
reach him from Vicksburg; but Loring did not come in time to render much
assistance south of Port Gibson. Two brigades of McPherson's corps
followed McClernand as fast as rations and ammunition could be issued,
and were ready to take position upon the battlefield whenever the 13th
corps could be got out of the way.

The country in this part of Mississippi stands on edge, as it were, the
roads running along the ridges except when they occasionally pass from
one ridge to another. Where there are no clearings the sides of the
hills are covered with a very heavy growth of timber and with
undergrowth, and the ravines are filled with vines and canebrakes,
almost impenetrable. This makes it easy for an inferior force to delay,
if not defeat, a far superior one.

Near the point selected by Bowen to defend, the road to Port Gibson
divides, taking two ridges which do not diverge more than a mile or two
at the widest point. These roads unite just outside the town. This
made it necessary for McClernand to divide his force. It was not only
divided, but it was separated by a deep ravine of the character above
described. One flank could not reinforce the other except by marching
back to