nt proclamations and official declarations, it is only because
the Spanish government lacks the boldness to unmask all its schemes,
while the Eastern war prevents France and Great Britain from sending
large armaments to Cuba to support it; and because the national vessels
and troops destined to swell the government forces in the island have
not all arrived. But for the existence of the war in the East, the
manifestoes of the captain-general would have been much more explicit.
As it is, they are sufficiently bold and menacing.

A peaceful solution to the question of Cuba, by its sale to the United
States, is not regarded as probable by the best-informed Creoles. They
say that, even if the queen were disposed to sell the island, it would
be impossible to obtain the consent of the Cortes. The integrity of the
Spanish domain, including all the islands, is protected by legal
enactment; and it would require the abrogation of a fundamental law
before it could be consummated.[11] Now, the Spanish subjects well
understand that they would not be likely to be gainers by the sale of
Cuba, however large a sum the United States might be willing to pay for
it, while the monopoly to trade, the bestowal of lucrative insular
offices on Spaniards alone, and other incidental advantages, give them a
direct interest in the maintenance of the present order of things. Those
who take this view of the question say that if Spain has not promptly
rejected the overtures supposed to have been made by our minister at
Madrid, this delay indicates only a conscious weakness, and not any
hesitation of purpose. It is simply a diplomatic trick--a temporizing
policy. Why, they ask, if Spain had any idea of parting with the island,
would she be making naval and military preparations on a grand and
costly scale, at home, while in the island she is making large levies,
and enrolling colored troops, not as militia, as the government has
falsely given out, but as regulars? We are reluctant to abandon the hope
of our purchasing the island, but candor compels us to state the
plausible arguments of those who assert that no success can possibly
attend the plan for its peaceable acquisition.

Within a brief space of time, the administration of General Pezuela has
been signalized by measures of great significance and importance: The
decree of the third of May; the order for the registration of slaves
introduced into the island in violation of the treaty of 1817; the