from the
pike, the wagon train following, just as it began to show light in the
east, the last of the wagons crossed a bridge at the north edge of the
town. Our division swung back in line of battle across the pike and became
the rear guard as the train moved off rapidly and cleared the way. Lane's
(our brigade) and Conrad's (formerly Harken's) swung into the pike,
leaving Opdyke's the rear guard. This order was kept, holding the enemy in
check until we reached the heights, about three miles south of Franklin.
Here Opdyke moved to the inside of the works being built, Lane and Conrad
moving back gradually from one position to another until nearly one-third
of a mile in front of the hastily constructed fortifications. Here,
through a blunder that General Schofield should not escape by charging it
to others, as we were in plain sight and had been on extreme duty without
cooked food of any kind for thirty-two hours, and every soldier in the
line knowing we were in a false position, our two brigades of the division
that had protected his rear saved the entire train, fought the battle of
Spring Hill and stood guard during the night while the army and train
moved on. To be left on the plains without works and both flanks exposed
was a gross error. The 26th Ohio was the extreme right of this exposed
line upon the plain. We saw the solid lines of Hood's army as it advanced.
We held this position but a short time. Those to the left of us being more
advanced, owing to the lay of the ground, than we, were struck and broken,
we fell back to the main line. Company E was less than 200 yards to the
right of the Carter House and the main line was not broken at this point.
We fought with other troops that occupied the works when we reached them.
Here the enemy was repulsed. A short distance to our left, near the Carter
House, they had gained part of our line. The 26th, under orders from
Captain Clark, moved or closed to the left to aid in repelling them from
this place. Our lines, with the other troops in the works, formed in ranks
four or five deep, the rear men loading and passing the guns to those in
front, and the firing was constant until long after dark, when Hood ceased
his efforts to make his lodgment permanent and firing gradually ceased.
Vanhorn in his history states (Vol. 2, page 202): "The defensive fire was
so rapid from 4 p. m. to nightfall that it was difficult to supply the
troops with ammunition. One hundred wagon loads of