ort, Ala., and return. It was
our understanding at the time that we were to be detached from the brigade
and become a part of the local garrison. We having been the first to
occupy and patrol the place, we felt that it was due us, and having been
so fearfully mangled at Chickamauga it would give time to partially
recuperate, but Sheridan objected, stating that such regiments, full of
experience, could not be spared from the front, and we were soon doing
picket duty. No supplies could be furnished by the country to which we had
access. The road traveled to bring them was a mountainous one and sixty
miles to railroad. The mules were shortly fed and heavily worked. The
rainy season opened and our rations grew less and less until a half ration
was issued to the men. Bacon was not issued, but fresh beef was used in
its place. The cattle were driven from the Ohio river, a distance of near
400 miles, and grazing in the mountainous country was not well calculated
to produce fat. Hence we got the expression, which originated at
Chattanooga during the siege, "beef dried on the hoof." This was the
situation when General Thomas telegraphed Grant: "We can hold the place
till we starve." Over ten thousand horses and mules died during the siege
and those that survived were in no condition for service.
October 27th, by a brilliant movement, Thomas at Chattanooga and Hooker at
Bridgeport Co-operating, we gained possession of the river from Brows
Ferry west, giving us water transportation to within nine or ten miles,
and in a few days the soldiers were on full rations. The horses and mules
did not fare so well. Bragg's army largely outnumbered that of General
Thomas, for, be it understood, his (Bragg's) army of the Tennessee had,
before the battle of Chickamauga, been reinforced by Buckner's army of
East Tennessee. Two divisions of Joe Johnson's army of Mississippi and
Longstreet's entire corps from Lee's army of Virginia and also a large per
cent of the parolled prisoners from Vicksburg had joined him. Hooker, with
15,000 from the Potomac army, had partially joined us and we were
expecting Sherman with 20,000 to arrive soon. Activity with us commenced,
indicating an offensive movement. We had been under the fire of the
enemy's guns since September 19th. Sherman was delayed by heavy rains and
high waters. Under Grant's instructions Thomas ordered the two divisions
of the 4th corps, Sheridan and Wood, to advance and drive the enemy from
t
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