to his efforts for peace," the
first ready concurrence of the Imperial Government, notwithstanding,
was thwarted at the decisive moment. With such a Government, Mr.
Wilson seems to imply, it was impossible in the long run for America
to remain on terms of peace. From that time henceforward--there can
be no question of any earlier period, because up to that moment he
had been in constant negotiation with us--he regarded the Imperial
Government as morally condemned. Then, however, he calls to mind very
clearly the feeble war-spirit of the American people in the spring
of 1917, which, as is well known, had to be whipped into the war by
propaganda on a prodigious scale. That is why the President says he
"hopes," that the moral conviction of the American people regarding
the injustice of Germany's cause would finally have triumphed over
his readiness for peace expressed so brilliantly as late as November,
1916. His words are, therefore, to be regarded as a reflection in
retrospect, not as a proof of an _a priori_ intention to urge the
United States into the war in any circumstances.

Truth to tell, if Mr. Wilson had really been striving to declare
war against us, he would, of course, only have needed to nod in
order to induce his whole country to fight after the _Lusitania_
incident, so great was the war feeling at that critical time. Later
on, the President concentrated all his efforts upon the idea of
being the Peacemaker of the world, and even made such prominent
use of the motto, "He kept us out of the war," in the campaign for
his re-election, that it is quite unthinkable that all this time
he should have secretly cherished the intention, ultimately, to
enter the war against Germany. In this matter, the fact that after
the rupture of diplomatic relations between America and Germany,
Mr. Wilson really did urge on the war by every means in his power,
proves nothing. For, after January 31st, 1917, Wilson himself was
a different man. Our rejection of his proposal to mediate, by our
announcement of the unrestricted U-boat war, which was to him utterly
incomprehensible, turned him into an embittered enemy of the Imperial
Government. But this is by no means a proof of the contention that,
before the date named, he was secretly watching for an opportunity
to make war upon Germany. Neither does it excuse the President
for having allowed himself at Versailles to be convinced of the
alleged complicity of the German people in the