ition of the first political power in the world. To this, there
was added certain other reasons of an ideal political nature, owing to
the fact that both Mr. Wilson and the great majority of the American
people wished to put an end to all the bloodshed and misery.
(3) The beginning of the unrestricted U-boat war was bound, as things
had developed, to lead automatically to the rupture of diplomatic
relations with the United States.
(4) As matters stood in America, the rupture of diplomatic relations
was equally bound automatically to bring about war with the United
States.
(5) War with the United States had to be averted at all costs,
because America's help meant giving our enemy such an overwhelming
preponderance of power, that a German defeat became an absolute
certainty.
(6) The political situation was such that, the acceptance of the
American offer of mediation was the only means of preventing the
United States from entering the war.
(7) If America did not enter the war, the Entente were not in a
position to beat us.
(8) If Mr. Wilson had succeeded in bringing both belligerent parties
to the conference table, a sort of Hubertsburg Peace[*] would have
been concluded. In view of the situation, a peace unfavorable to
ourselves was unthinkable. Who, at that time, could have compelled
us to accept terms which we regarded as incompatible with Germany's
position in the world? Herr Helfferich before the Examination Committee
of the National Assembly, expressed the view that in the end Mr.
Wilson would have forced peace upon us with the butt-end of a rifle.
But whence would he have obtained this butt-end? He had not one, and
it took him a year to create an army. No one who is familiar with
the United States can believe that it would ever have been possible
to drive the Americans into the war, once a Peace Conference had
assembled. For then it would only have been a matter of deciding
the fate of one or two pieces of territory or colonies, in which the
Americans would not have felt the slightest interest. Naturally,
we should have had to restore Belgium and accept the disarmament
programme, etc. But we had already declared ourselves ready to take
these measures, and, as regards disarmament, etc., this reform was
inevitable, in view of the economic position of all the countries
concerned. If America had not entered the war, no one could have
forced us to accept less advantageous terms than the _status quo
ante_,
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