than van Helmont, he did not
have any greater diagnostic acumen. And clearly, from the standpoint of
scientific method, he lacked any sharp criterion of cure. Various
patients were ill with various diseases; he gave them one or another
preparation; the patients recovered. Controls there were none. Boyle,
with great enthusiasm, believed that through natural philosophy we would
eventually discover "the true causes and seats of diseases" and also
find out effective remedies which would quickly free the patient from
the disease.[65] But faith and enthusiasm did not compensate for the
_post hoc propter hoc_ attitude.

According to Galenic concepts, if diseases are due to alterations of
humors either in their quality or in their proportions, then the
suitable remedy will restore the appropriate quality or proportion. In
Galenic doctrine, the disturbance of the humors should be perceptible,
and a sound Galenic remedy should work by perceptibly changing the
nature and proportion of the humors back to normal. However, side by
side with the Galenic medical doctrines, there were the other prevalent
doctrines, among which I can mention the idea of "specifics." I can
emphasize three features: the specific remedy was active against a
particular disease, in a quite specific fashion, in the same way that an
antidote acted against a specific poison; second, the effectiveness was
a matter of direct experience, based on empirical observation; and
third, the mode of action remained relatively obscure, but nevertheless
the medicines did not seem to behave as did the so-called "Galenicals."
Thus, whether they acted by "sympathy," or by a special hidden virtue,
or by a peculiar microcosmic energy, we cannot say. But the _fact_
remains that many people asserted the specific effectiveness[66] of this
or that remedy against a specific disease--e.g., that snakeweed was an
effective cure for the bite of a serpent.

Learned physicians, unfortunately, refused in large part to accept the
validity of these alleged cures. Their hesitancy rested not on
statistical evidence or on niceties of scientific method, but on the
grounds that the alleged mode of operation was quite unintelligible and
not at all in accord with accepted doctrine.

Boyle, as a chemist, insisted on keeping an open mind in regard to
so-called specifics. He objected strongly to the argument that simply
because we cannot account for their mode of action, we should conclude
that they