n each of the several commonwealths, men of the first rank
in talent, social position, and sound moral and political integrity,
became engaged in the discussion of the great question of national
government. That conflict had commenced in the general convention, but
the proceedings of that body were under the seal of secrecy. Yet the
positions assumed by the delegates in the general discussion in their
several states, revealed the fact that extreme diversity of opinion had
prevailed in the convention, and that the constitution was composed of
compromises marked with the scars of severe conflict.

Referring to these differences of opinion in the convention, Washington
remarked to Catharine Macaulay Graham, in a letter written on the
sixteenth of November, that "the various and opposite interests which
were to be conciliated, the local prejudices which were to be subdued,
the diversity of opinions and sentiments which were to be reconciled,
and, in fine, the sacrifices which were necessary to be made on all
sides for the general welfare, combined to make it a work of so
intricate and difficult a nature, that I think it is much to be wondered
at that anything could have been produced with such unanimity as the
constitution proposed.... Whether it will be adopted by the people or
not remains yet to be determined."

To Lafayette he wrote in February following: "It appears to me little
short of a miracle that the delegates from so many states, different
from each other, as you know, in their manners, circumstances, and
prejudices, should unite in forming a system of national government, so
little liable to well-founded objections." After alluding to its obvious
defects, he continued:--

"With regard to the two great points, the pivots upon which
the whole machine must move, my creed is simply: First, that
the general government is not invested with more powers than
are indispensably necessary to perform the functions of a
good government; and, consequently, that no objection ought
to be made against the quantity of power delegated to it.
Secondly, that these powers, as the appointment of all
rulers will for ever arise from, and at short stated
intervals recur to, the free suffrage of the people, are so
distributed among the legislative, executive, and judicial
branches, into which the general government is arranged,
that it can never be in danger of degenerating in