laimed, however, that there entered into Nelson's
thoughts, for Italy, any such diversion as that by which the Spanish
Peninsular War some years later drained the life blood of France. The
time, indeed, was not yet ripe, nor would the scene have been in any
way as favorable to Great Britain; and, moreover, so far from being
ready to threaten, her energies were effectually constrained to her
own defence, by the superior audacity and direct threats of Bonaparte.
Even the limited suggestions for the employment of troops in the
Mediterranean, made by Nelson from time to time, failed to receive
attention, and he himself was left to struggle on as best he might,
with inadequate means and upon a bare defensive, even in naval
matters. Great Britain, in short, had stripped herself, incautiously,
so bare, and was so alarmed by the French demonstrations of invasion,
that she for the moment could think only of the safety of her
territory and of her home waters, and her offensive operations were
confined to the sea.

Bonaparte understood as fully as Nelson the importance of the
Mediterranean to him. His mind was set upon the extension of France's
dominion therein,--in its islands, upon its northern and southern
shores, and in the East; nor was he troubled with scruples as to the
means by which that object might be attained. During the short peace
of Amiens, Lord Keith had felt it necessary to take precautions
against the re-occupation of Corfu by the French troops; and again at
a later date had stationed a ship for the same purpose at the Madalena
Islands, belonging to Sardinia, which Nelson afterwards made a
rendezvous for his fleet. Algiers, too, had attracted the First
Consul's attention. "Algiers will be French in one year after a
peace," wrote Nelson in August, 1804. "You see it, and a man may run
and read; that is the plan of Buonaparte." "The Ministers of the Dey
must know, that an armament at Toulon, and a large army, after the
peace with Great Britain, was intended to land and plunder Algiers,
which they doubtless would have effected, had not a British fleet been
placed in Oristan Bay [Sardinia] to watch their motions." These and
similar reasons had led the British Government to maintain the
Mediterranean Squadron nearly upon a war footing during the peace.
But, if Bonaparte's purpose was fixed to control the Mediterranean
some day, it now was set also upon the invasion of England; and
although he looked and plotted in man