persons (as historians represent Servius Tullius to have done in the
early constitution of Rome); because the contest between the rich and
the poor is not a struggle between corporation and corporation, but a
contest between men and men,--a competition, not between districts, but
between descriptions. It would answer its purpose better, if the scheme
were inverted: that the votes of the masses were rendered equal, and
that the votes within each mass were proportioned to property.
Let us suppose one man in a district (it is an easy supposition) to
contribute as much as a hundred of his neighbors. Against these he has
but one vote. If there were but one representative for the mass, his
poor neighbors would outvote him by an hundred to one for that single
representative. Bad enough! But amends are to be made him. How? The
district, in virtue of his wealth, is to choose, say ten members instead
of one: that is to say, by paying a very large contribution he has the
happiness of being outvoted, an hundred to one, by the poor, for ten
representatives, instead of being outvoted exactly in the same
proportion for a single member. In truth, instead of benefiting by this
superior quantity of representation, the rich man is subjected to an
additional hardship. The increase of representation within his province
sets up nine persons more, and as many more than nine as there may be
democratic candidates, to cabal and intrigue and to flatter the people
at his expense and to his oppression. An interest is by this means held
out to multitudes of the inferior sort, in obtaining a salary of
eighteen livres a day, (to them a vast object,) besides the pleasure of
a residence in Paris, and their share in the government of the kingdom.
The more the objects of ambition are multiplied and become democratic,
just in that proportion the rich are endangered.
Thus it must fare between the poor and the rich in the province deemed
aristocratic, which in its internal relation is the very reverse of that
character. In its external relation, that is, in its relation to the
other provinces, I cannot see how the unequal representation which is
given to masses on account of wealth becomes the means of preserving the
equipoise and the tranquillity of the commonwealth. For, if it be one of
the objects to secure the weak from being crushed by the strong, (as in
all society undoubtedly it is,) how are the smaller and poorer of these
masses to be saved from th
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