ts and 1,360
voters, both together. These will form only _two primary assemblies_,
and send only _six_ deputies to the _commune_.

When the assembly of the _commune_ comes to vote on the _basis of
territory_, which principle is first admitted to operate in that
assembly, the _single canton_, which has _half_ the territory of the
_other two_, will have _ten_ voices to _six_ in the election of _three
deputies_ to the assembly of the department, chosen on the express
ground of a representation of territory. This inequality, striking as it
is, will be yet highly aggravated, if we suppose, as we fairly may, the
_several_ other cantons of the _commune_ to fall proportionally short of
the average population, as much as the _principal canton_ exceeds it.

Now as to _the basis of contribution_, which also is a principle
admitted first to operate in the assembly of the _commune_. Let us again
take _one_ canton, such as is stated above. If the whole of the direct
contributions paid by a great trading or manufacturing town be divided
equally among the inhabitants, each individual will be found to pay much
more than an individual living in the country according to the same
average. The whole paid by the inhabitants of the former will be more
than the whole paid by the inhabitants of the latter,--we may fairly
assume one third more. Then the 12,700 inhabitants, or 2,193 voters of
the canton, will pay as much as 19,050 inhabitants, or 3,289 voters of
the _other cantons_, which are nearly the estimated proportion of
inhabitants and voters of _five_ other cantons. Now the 2,193 voters
will, as I before said, send only _ten_ deputies to the assembly; the
3,289 voters will send _sixteen_. Thus, for an _equal_ share in the
contribution of the whole _commune_, there will be a difference of
_sixteen_ voices to _ten_ in voting for deputies to be chosen on the
principle of representing the general contribution of the whole
_commune_.

By the same mode of computation, we shall find 15,875 inhabitants, or
2,741 voters of the _other_ cantons, who pay _one sixth_ LESS to the
contribution of the whole _commune_, will have _three_ voices MORE than
the 12,700 inhabitants, or 2,193 voters of the _one_ canton.

Such is the fantastical and unjust inequality between mass and mass, in
this curious repartition of the rights of representation arising out of
_territory_ and _contribution_. The qualifications which these confer
are in truth negative quali