er as he well
knew, and he rightly assumed that I followed his instructions with
reluctance, and, he might have added, with grave concern.
As a matter of interest in this connection and as a possible source from
which the President may have acquired knowledge of my views as to the
conduct of the negotiations, I would call attention again to the
conference which I had with Colonel House on December 17, 1918, and to
which I have referred in connection with the subject of international
arbitration. During that conference I said to the Colonel "that I
thought that there ought to be a preliminary treaty of peace negotiated
without delay, and that all the details as to a League of Nations,
boundaries, and indemnities should wait for the time being. The Colonel
replied that he was not so sure about delaying the creation of a League,
as he was afraid that it never could be put through unless it was done
at once. I told him that possibly he was right, but that I was opposed
to anything which delayed the peace." This quotation is from my
memorandum made at the time of our conversation. I think that the same
reason for insisting on negotiating the Covenant largely influenced the
course of the President. My impression at the time was that the Colonel
favored a preliminary treaty provided that there was included in it the
full plan for a League of Nations, which to me seemed to be
impracticable.
There can be little doubt that, if there had been a settled programme
prepared or a tentative treaty drafted, there would have been a
preliminary treaty which might and probably would have postponed the
negotiations as to a League. Possibly the President realized that this
danger of excluding the Covenant existed and for that reason was
unwilling to make a definite programme or to let a draft-treaty be
drawn. At least it may have added another reason for his proceeding
without advising the Commissioners of his purposes.
As I review the entire negotiations and the incidents which took place
at Paris, President Wilson's inherent dislike to depart in the least
from an announced course, a characteristic already referred to, seems to
me to have been the most potent influence in determining his method of
work during the Peace Conference. He seemed to think that, having marked
out a definite plan of action, any deviation from it would show
intellectual weakness or vacillation of purpose. Even when there could
be no doubt that in view of chang
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