ization participation: APEC, AsDB, ASEAN, CCC, CP,
ESCAP, FAO, G-77, IAEA, IBRD, ICAO, ICFTU, ICRM, IDA, IFAD, IFC,
IFRCS, IHO, ILO, IMF, IMO, Inmarsat, Intelsat, Interpol, IOC, IOM,
ISO, ITU, NAM, PCA, UN, UNCTAD, UNESCO, UNHCR, UNIDO, UNIKOM, UNU,
UPU, WCL, WFTU, WHO, WIPO, WMO, WTrO

Diplomatic representation in the US:
chief of mission: Ambassador NIT Phibunsongkhram
chancery: 1024 Wisconsin Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20007
telephone: [1] (202) 944-3600
FAX: [1] (202) 944-3611
consulate(s) general: Chicago, Los Angeles, and New York

Diplomatic representation from the US:
chief of mission: Ambassador William H. ITOH
embassy: 120-122 Wireless Road, Bangkok
mailing address: APO AP 96546
telephone: [66] (2) 205-4000
FAX: [66] (2) 254-2990
consulate(s) general: Chiang Mai

Flag description: five horizontal bands of red (top), white, blue
(double width), white, and red

@Thailand:Economy

Economy-overview: In 1997/98, the Thai economy is in a deep recession
as a result of the severe financial problems facing many Thai firms,
particularly banks and finance companies. In the early 1990s, Thailand
liberalized financial inflows; banks and other firms borrowed in
dollars and did not hedge their positions because there was no
perceived exchange rate risk. These funds financed a property boom
that began to taper off in the mid-1990s. In addition, export growth -
previously a key driver of the Thai economy-collapsed in 1996,
resulting in growing doubts that the Bank of Thailand could maintain
the baht's peg to the dollar. The Bank mounted an expensive defense of
the exchange rate that nearly depleted foreign exchange reserves, then
decided to float the exchange rate, triggering a sharp increase in
foreign liabilities that cash-strapped Thai firms were already having
trouble repaying. In August 1997, the government headed by Prime
Minister CHAWALIT signed an agreement with the IMF for access to a $14
billion facility to supplement foreign exchange reserves and restore
financial market stability. CHAWALIT resigned in November 1997,
however, under pressure for lacking a coherent approach to managing
the IMF program and the financial crisis. Democratic Party leader
CHUAN Likphai formed a seven-party coalition government and closely
adhered to the IMF program, tentatively reestablishing financial
stability by February 1998. An economic turnaround requires
rescheduling the large short-term foreign liabilities of Thai firms,