nce in a war or a revolution, and so without assuming
an incomprehensible, supernatural force--a miracle--one cannot admit
that words can be the immediate cause of the movements of millions of
men. On the other hand, even if we admitted that words could be the
cause of events, history shows that the expression of the will of
historical personages does not in most cases produce any effect, that
is to say, their commands are often not executed, and sometimes the very
opposite of what they order occurs.

Without admitting divine intervention in the affairs of humanity we
cannot regard "power" as the cause of events.

Power, from the standpoint of experience, is merely the relation that
exists between the expression of someone's will and the execution of
that will by others.

To explain the conditions of that relationship we must first establish a
conception of the expression of will, referring it to man and not to the
Deity.

If the Deity issues a command, expresses His will, as ancient history
tells us, the expression of that will is independent of time and is not
caused by anything, for the Divinity is not controlled by an event. But
speaking of commands that are the expression of the will of men acting
in time and in relation to one another, to explain the connection of
commands with events we must restore: (1) the condition of all that
takes place: the continuity of movement in time both of the events and
of the person who commands, and (2) the inevitability of the connection
between the person commanding and those who execute his command.

CHAPTER VI

Only the expression of the will of the Deity, not dependent on time, can
relate to a whole series of events occurring over a period of years or
centuries, and only the Deity, independent of everything, can by His
sole will determine the direction of humanity's movement; but man acts
in time and himself takes part in what occurs.

Reinstating the first condition omitted, that of time, we see that no
command can be executed without some preceding order having been given
rendering the execution of the last command possible.

No command ever appears spontaneously, or itself covers a whole series
of occurrences; but each command follows from another, and never refers
to a whole series of events but always to one moment only of an event.

When, for instance, we say that Napoleon ordered armies to go to war,
we combine in one simultaneous expression a whole