nection between
these intrigues and the murder of the 28th of June."

On the following day, Thursday, July 23, 1914, Count Berchtold
telegraphed to Count Mensdorff, Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at
London, that, as Great Britain of all the powers might be most
easily led to form an impartial judgment on the action taken, in
presenting the copy of the note, he should point out that Serbia
might have rendered less acute the serious steps she must expect
from Austria-Hungary by spontaneously investigating the conspiracy
tending to the crime of Sarajevo, and that on the contrary she had
endeavored to wipe out all its traces, for example, in the case of
the Serbian civil servant Ciganovic, who was compromised by the
independent testimony of both of the assassins, and who was in
Belgrade on the day of the crime, yet whom the director of the
Serbian press declared to be completely unknown in that city.

"The short time limit attached to our demand must be attributed
to our long experience of the dilatory arts of Serbia.

"The requirements which we demand that Serbia should fulfill, and
which indeed contain nothing which is not a matter of course in
the intercourse between states which are to live in peace and
friendship, cannot be made the subject of negotiations and
compromise; and, having regard to our economic interests, we
cannot take the risk of a method of political action by which it
would be open to Serbia at pleasure to prolong the crisis which
has arisen."

Later in the day Count Mensdorff had an interview with Sir Edward
Grey, British Secretary of Foreign Affairs, the substance of which
Sir Edward communicated on the same date to Sir Maurice de Bunsen,
British Ambassador at Vienna.

Count Mensdorff intimated the general nature of the note. Sir Edward
regretted the time limit set as akin to an ultimatum, and so likely
to inflame opinion in Russia, and render difficult securing a
satisfactory reply from Serbia. If it later developed that
proceedings were unduly protracted, a time limit could then be set.
By that time Russian opinion would be less excited, and, if the case
appeared strong against Serbia, the Russian Government would be in
a position to influence Serbia to reply satisfactorily to the
demands of the note. A time limit was generally a thing used only as
a last resort, when all other means had failed.

Count Mensdorff instanced the bad faith of S