and
that for any thing we can prove to the contrary, the connexion between
the sensation and the perception, as well as that between the impression
and the sensation, may be both arbitrary; that it is therefore by no
means impossible that our sensations may be merely the occasions on
which the correspondent perceptions are excited; and that at any rate
the consideration of these sensations, which are attributes of mind,
can throw no light on the manner in which we acquire our knowledge of
the existence and qualities of body. From this view of the subject, it
follows that it is the external objects themselves, and not any species
or images of these objects (_or, we may add, any mere agglomeration of
present and remembered sensations_) that the mind perceives; and that
although, by the constitution of our nature, certain sensations are
rendered the constant antecedents of our perceptions, yet it is just as
difficult to explain how our perceptions are obtained by their means, as
it would be upon the supposition that the mind were all at once inspired
with them, without any concomitant sensations whatever."--(_Elements of
the Philosophy of the Human Mind_, Vol. i. p. 92.)

It is seen here that both Reid and Stewart considered perception as a
simple elementary fact or phenomenon of the human mind, and refused
their assent to that analysis which would resolve it into sensation,
accompanied with certain acts of memory and judgment. This last,
however, has been the most popular amongst modern psychologists, who
have many of them expressed an extreme impatience at the apparent
sluggishness of these veterans in philosophy. We remember the time when
we shared the same feeling of impatience, and thought it a most useless
encumbrance to maintain this _perception_ amongst the simple elements of
the human mind: we now think otherwise, and see reason to acquiesce in
the sound judgment, which took up the only safe, though unostentatious
position, which this embarrassing subject affords.

Dr Brown, it is well known, departed from his predecessors at this
point, and may here be considered as one of the ablest representatives
of the _sensational_ school. He expended much ingenuity in his analysis
of perception, though in our opinion with very little result. No one saw
more distinctly than he, that sensation alone could never give us the
idea of an external object, or of space, or any thing external to the
mind. No one has more satisfacto