es 511
The fleets indicated as the keys of the situation everywhere 513
Elements essential to an active naval war 514
The bases of operations in the war of 1778:--
In Europe 515
On the American continent 515
In the West Indies 516
In the East Indies 518
Strategic bearing of the trade-winds and monsoons 518
The bases abroad generally deficient in resources 519
Consequent increased importance of the communications 519
The navies the guardians of the communications 520
Need of intermediate ports between Europe and India 520
Inquiry into the disposition of the naval forces 521
Difficulty of obtaining information at sea 521
Perplexity as to the destination of a naval expedition 522
Disadvantages of the defensive 523
England upon the defensive in 1778 523
Consequent necessity for wise and vigorous action 524
The key of the situation 525
British naval policy in the Napoleonic wars 525
British naval policy in the Seven Years' War 527
Difficulties attending this policy 527
Disposition of the British navy in the war of 1778 528
Resulting inferiority on many critical occasions 528
Effect on the navy of the failure to fortify naval bases 529
The distribution of the British navy exposes it to being
out-numbered at many points 531
The British naval policy in 1778 and in other wars compared 532
Naval policy of the allies 535
Divergent counsels of the coalition 536
"Ulterior objects" 537
The allied navies systematically assume a defensive attitude 538
Dangers of this line of action 538
Glamour of commerce-destroying 539
The conditions of peace, 1783
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