injured are not necessarily made worse, but only harmed or
ill-treated.
The second of the three arguments, 'that the just does not aim at
excess,' has a real meaning, though wrapped up in an enigmatical form.
That the good is of the nature of the finite is a peculiarly Hellenic
sentiment, which may be compared with the language of those modern
writers who speak of virtue as fitness, and of freedom as obedience to
law. The mathematical or logical notion of limit easily passes into an
ethical one, and even finds a mythological expression in the conception
of envy (Greek). Ideas of measure, equality, order, unity, proportion,
still linger in the writings of moralists; and the true spirit of the
fine arts is better conveyed by such terms than by superlatives.
'When workmen strive to do better than well,
They do confound their skill in covetousness.' (King John.)
The harmony of the soul and body, and of the parts of the soul with
one another, a harmony 'fairer than that of musical notes,' is the true
Hellenic mode of conceiving the perfection of human nature.
In what may be called the epilogue of the discussion with Thrasymachus,
Plato argues that evil is not a principle of strength, but of discord
and dissolution, just touching the question which has been often treated
in modern times by theologians and philosophers, of the negative nature
of evil. In the last argument we trace the germ of the Aristotelian
doctrine of an end and a virtue directed towards the end, which again is
suggested by the arts. The final reconcilement of justice and happiness
and the identity of the individual and the State are also intimated.
Socrates reassumes the character of a 'know-nothing;' at the same time
he appears to be not wholly satisfied with the manner in which the
argument has been conducted. Nothing is concluded; but the tendency of
the dialectical process, here as always, is to enlarge our conception of
ideas, and to widen their application to human life.
BOOK II. Thrasymachus is pacified, but the intrepid Glaucon insists on
continuing the argument. He is not satisfied with the indirect manner
in which, at the end of the last book, Socrates had disposed of the
question 'Whether the just or the unjust is the happier.' He begins
by dividing goods into three classes:--first, goods desirable in
themselves; secondly, goods desirable in themselves and for their
results; thirdly, goods desirable for their results only. He th
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