n. He was coming up from the Piraeus outside the
north wall, and he passed a spot where there were dead bodies lying
by the executioner. He felt a longing desire to see them and also an
abhorrence of them; at first he turned away and shut his eyes, then,
suddenly tearing them open, he said,--'Take your fill, ye wretches, of
the fair sight.' Now is there not here a third principle which is often
found to come to the assistance of reason against desire, but never
of desire against reason? This is passion or spirit, of the separate
existence of which we may further convince ourselves by putting the
following case:--When a man suffers justly, if he be of a generous
nature he is not indignant at the hardships which he undergoes: but when
he suffers unjustly, his indignation is his great support; hunger and
thirst cannot tame him; the spirit within him must do or die, until the
voice of the shepherd, that is, of reason, bidding his dog bark no
more, is heard within. This shows that passion is the ally of reason. Is
passion then the same with reason? No, for the former exists in children
and brutes; and Homer affords a proof of the distinction between them
when he says, 'He smote his breast, and thus rebuked his soul.'

And now, at last, we have reached firm ground, and are able to infer
that the virtues of the State and of the individual are the same. For
wisdom and courage and justice in the State are severally the wisdom and
courage and justice in the individuals who form the State. Each of the
three classes will do the work of its own class in the State, and each
part in the individual soul; reason, the superior, and passion, the
inferior, will be harmonized by the influence of music and gymnastic.
The counsellor and the warrior, the head and the arm, will act together
in the town of Mansoul, and keep the desires in proper subjection. The
courage of the warrior is that quality which preserves a right opinion
about dangers in spite of pleasures and pains. The wisdom of the
counsellor is that small part of the soul which has authority and
reason. The virtue of temperance is the friendship of the ruling and the
subject principles, both in the State and in the individual. Of justice
we have already spoken; and the notion already given of it may
be confirmed by common instances. Will the just state or the just
individual steal, lie, commit adultery, or be guilty of impiety to
gods and men? 'No.' And is not the reason of this tha