sary, but in that case they are necessary
evils; and, as a class of motives, they should never be the rule, but
invariably the exception.--We must not, however, be misunderstood. We
are no more for abandoning _secular rewards_, than we are for giving up
corporal punishments. We speak not here of their _abandonment_, but of
their _enlightened regulation_;--both of them may be of service. But
what we wish to point out as an important feature in moral training is,
that they are, or should be, but seldom necessary; and that they ought
never to be resorted to except when they really are so. The differences
observable in the results arising from _secular_, and those from _moral_
motives, are very different, both as regards their power in restraining
from vice, and their influence in stimulating to virtue. What, for
example, would we think of the moral condition of a child, or of the
virtue of his actions, if he had to be hired by a comfit, or a piece of
money, to do every act of kindness which he performed; or if he refused
to relieve a sister, or prevent an injury to his companion, unless
similarly rewarded? This secular spirit in morals, when thus exposed in
its deformity, is obnoxious to every sentiment of virtue, and shews
itself to be a mere system of buying and selling. But how very different
does the reward appear, and the feeling which it excites, when that
reward assumes the moral character, and is found to be the desire of
pleasing the parent, and much more when it seeks the approbation of the
Almighty? Every one will see how beneficial and elevating the effects of
cherishing the one must be, and how debasing comparatively is the
influence of the other. That children are capable of being acted upon by
these higher motives, we have already seen; and, when we aim at securing
the effects which they are calculated to produce, we are closely
imitating Nature in one of her most important operations, and may
therefore calculate upon a corresponding degree of success.[25]

4. In the operations of Nature by means of the moral sense, we found,
that the impressions made upon the mind in reference to sin or duty,
were always most efficient, and most permanent, when the sin or duty was
presented to them in the form of example;--that the example increased in
efficiency and interest as it was familiar or near;--and that it became
still more powerful when it was actually seen or experienced.--From
these circumstances we are led to c